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Attribution of Stock Ownership in Redemptions by
the Closely Held Corporation: David Metzger
Trust v. Commissioner
The widow and three children of David Metzger and the
trusts established for their benefit owned the stock of Metzger
Dairies, Inc.1 After years of family discord and bitter disputes
among the three children over the operation of the business,2
the three siblings decided to separate their business dealings.
At the shareholder's direction, the corporation redeemed all
stock owned by the mother, by both sisters, by the individual
trusts established for the benefit of the two sisters, and by the
David Metzger Trust, which the deceased father had established for the benefit of his entire family.3 The son retained his
1. David Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 42, 48 (1981).
2. Ad at 44-47. Disputes among the family members concerned the control and business decisions of a related corporation owned by the family, the
management of the trust, the use of the family's rural estate, and the differential amounts of income the family members received from the family
businesses.
3. Id. at 47. The court found that stock ownership in the corporation was
distributed as follows:
Shareholder

Actual Ownership
prior to
redemption

David Metzger Trust
Nora (mother)
Jacob (son)
Cecilia (daughter)
Catherine (daughter)
Trust for Jacob
Trust for Cecilia
Trust for Catherine
Trust for Nan
(Jacob's daughter)
Trust for David
(Jacob's son)
Total

Constructive Ownership

after
redemption

prior to
redemption

after
redemption

3,000

1,221

420

-0-

420
600

-0600-

600

-0-

600

-0-

120

120

120

-0-

120

-0-

-03,000

1,221

294

1,221
See id. at 48, 51, 65. Prior to the redemption, I.R.C. § 318(a) (2) (B) (1976) attributed the stock that the individual trusts owned to each of the individual benefiSection 318(a) (3) (B) then attributed all of the actually and
ciaries.
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stock and control of the corporation. 4 To avoid treatment of the
distribution as dividend income, the David Metzger Trust argued that the attribution rules of section 318 of the Internal
Revenue Code (the Code) did not make it the constructive
owner of the remaining stock; the trust claimed that these rules
did not apply, both because of family discord and because it
waived the application of the family and entity attribution rules
by filing the agreement required by section 302(c) (2) (A) (iii). 5
The Tax Court found that the distribution was a dividend, holding first, that family hostility does not nullify the family attribution rules of section 318, so the redemption was essentially
equivalent to a dividend under section 302(b) (1),6 and, second,
that section 302(c) (2) (A) (iii) does not allow the trust to waive
the entity attribution rules of section 318, so the redemption
was not a complete termination of the trust's interests in the
corporation under section 302(b) (3).7 David Metzger Trust v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 42 (1981).
When a corporation redeems a shareholder's stock, 8 the
distribution of property 9 to the shareholder is taxable either as
ordinary income or as a capital gain. If the distribution is
treated as a corporate dividend, it is taxable as ordinary income
to the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits.' 0 Districonstructively owned stock of each of the David Metzger Trust beneficiaries to
the David Metzger Trust, resulting in this trust owning 100% of the stock. After
the redemption, section 318(a) (2) (B) attributed the stock owned by the trusts
established for Jacob and his children to those individuals. Section 318(a) (1)
then attributed his children's constructively owned stock to Jacob. Thus, Jacob
owned the remaining 1,221 shares either actually or constructively, which resulted in the attribution of these shares to the David Metzger Trust under section 318(a) (3) (B). For a further discussion of section 318, see infra notes 15-21
and accompanying text.
4. The trusts established for the son and his children also held stock in
the corporation after the redemption. See supra note 3.
5. 76 T.C. at 51-52.
6. Id. at 42. The court also held that family hostility does not nullify the
attribution rules of I.R.C. § 267 (1976), which governs the deduction of accrued
interest expense.
7. 76 T.C. at 42.
8. LR.C. § 317(b) (1976) defines corporate redemptions as the acquisition
"by a corporation [of] its stock from a shareholder in exchange for property,
whether or not the stock so acquired is cancelled, retired, or held as treasury

stock."
9. LR.C. § 317(a) (1976) defines property as "money, securities, and any
other property; except that such term does not include stock in the corporation
making the distribution (or rights to acquire such stock)."
10. See I.R.C. §§ 301(c) (1), 316 (1976). If the distribution is not a sale or
exchange of property, the amount of the distribution that exceeds the corporation's earnings and profits decreases the adjusted basis of the stock, leaving
any remainder taxable as a capital gain. See id. §§ 301(c) (2), (3).
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butions which are treated as gain from the sale or exchange of
property are taxable at the more favorable capital gains rates."
Section 302(b) sets out the tests for determining whether a distribution falls into this latter category.12 Section 302(b) (1) provides that the redemption is an exchange of property "if the
redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend."' 3 Section 302(b) (3) provides a more definite standard, allowing exchange treatment if the redemption completely terminates the
shareholder's interest.14
The attribution rules of section 318,15 which section
302(c) (1) explicitly applies to section 302(b),16 complicate the
interpretation of section 302(b). There are three parts to these
attribution rules. The family attribution provisions of section
318(a) (1) specify that taxpayers constructively own the stock
that certain members of their family own.17 The entity attribution provisions of section 318(a) (2) state that the beneficiaries
of trusts and estates and the majority shareholders of corporations constructively own the stock owned by these entities.18
The parallel entity attribution provisions of section 318 (a) (3)
provide that these entities, in turn, constructively own the
stock owned by their beneficiaries or majority shareholders.19
Congress enacted these attribution rules to prevent tax avoid11. See id. §§ 301(c) (2), (3), 302(a). See also B. BrnTKER &J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 9.20, at 9-10 (4th
ed. 1979).
12. I.R.C. § 302(b) (1976). See generally Holden & Serling, Section 302 Redemptions: New Principles and Prospects, 11 Curi. . REV. 553 (1980); Kahn,
Stock Redemptions: The Standardsfor Qualifying as a PurchaseUnder Section
302(b), 50 FORDHiat L. REV. 1 (1981).
13. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1) (1976).
14. Id. § 302(b) (3). Section 302(b) (2) (A) provides exchange treatment if
the distribution "is substantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder." Id. § 302(b) (2) (A).
15. Id. § 318(a).
16. Id. § 302(c) (1).
17. Id. § 318(a) (1). This section attributes to the taxpayer stock that the
taxpayer's spouse, children, grandchildren, and parents own.
18. Id. § 318(a)(2).
19. Id. § 318(a) (3). Section 318(a) (5) of the Code governs double attribution. Section 318(a) (5) (B) prevents double attribution between family members, so that stock that individuals constructively own under section 318(a) (1)
is not reattributed to their family members by multiple applications of the family attribution rules. Similarly, section 318 (a) (5) (C) prevents double attribution between economic entities and individuals, so that stock that individuals
own is not reattributed to another after attribution to an economic entity. The
Code, however, does not prohibit double attribution if the family and entity attribution rules apply separately. Thus stock that a trust owns is attributed to
its beneficiaries, and then is reattributed to the family members of those beneficiaries. There was such double attribution in Metzger. See supra note 3.
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ance. 20 Without these rules, shareholders could cause a closely
held corporation to redeem their stock and could treat the proceeds as a capital gain under section 302(b), even though they
still exercised complete control over the corporation through
related family members or entities that retained stock in the
corporation.2 1 Such a result would violate the policy underlying this section of the Code, which favors capital gains treatment only if one can characterize the redemption as a sale of
the shareholder's stock.
There are two limited exceptions to the application of these
attribution rules to section 302(b). Section 302(c) (2) allows a
taxpayer to waive the family attribution rules if the redemption
completely terminates a distributee's interest under section
302(b) (3).22 In addition, section 318(a) (1) (A) (i) states that the
stock owned by legally separated or divorced spouses shall not
be attributed between them.23 No other provision in the Code,

however, expressly identifies any factual circumstances, inclrding family hostility, that would mitigate the application of the
attribution rules to section 302(b).
In determining whether family hostility might nevertheless
allow taxpayers to avoid the family attribution rules under section 302(b) (1),24 one must first examine the origins of section
20. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1954), reprintedin 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4061; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1954),
reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4676.

21. See Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir. 1979); Estate of
Squier v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 950, 955-56 (1961); H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra
note 20, at 36, reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4061. See generally Philipps & Kelley, Waiver of Attribution Rules in Internal Revenue Code
Section 302 Redemptionsfrom Estates, 5 J. CORP. L. 241 (1980); Comment, Constructive Ownership as a Rebuttable Presumption of Control Under Haft Trust
v. Commissioner, 28 ME. L. REV. 222 (1976).
22. LR.C. § 302(c) (2) (1976). See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
See also Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir. 1979); S. REP. No.
1622, supra note 20, at 45, reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS at 4676;
Philipps & Kelley, supra note 21, at 246-47.
23. I.R.C. § 318(a) (1) (A) (i) (1976).
24. The taxpayer in Metzger also suggested that family hostility should
mitigate the application of the family attribution rules to section 302(b) (3). 76
T.C. at 51-52. The court, however, held that family hostility could only be considered if some change in stock ownership occurred after application of the attribution rules. Since no such change had occurred in Metzger, family hostility
was not an admissible factor for the court to consider. Id. at 61-62, 65. Other
courts have concentrated exclusively on the impact of family hostility on section 302(b)(1), omitting all discussion of its effect on section 302(b)(3). See,
e.g., Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43, 46-48 (1st Cir. 1975). The courts
likely reject the latter claim without much analysis because section 302(b) (3) is
designed as a narrow safe-harbor test, in contrast to the vague coverage of section 302(b) (1). See infra notes 114-31 and accompanying text.
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302(b) and the judicial interpretations of that section. Under
section 115(g), the predecessor of section 302(b), the 1939 Internal Revenue Code treated stock redemptions as exchanges
only if the accompanying distribution was not "essentially
equivalent to... a taxable dividend."25 Congress was dissatisfied with this provision because its vagueness generated "considerable confusion" regarding which redemptions were not
equivalent to a dividend.26 The 1954 Code thus established
more '"precise standards" 2 7 for determining the appropriate tax
treatment of corporate distributions in sections 302(b) (2) and
302(b) (3).
Although Congress retained the dividend
equivalency test in section 302(b) (1), it arguably intended to
reduce the uncertainty that the former Code generated by restricting the scope of factual inquiry that section 115(g) had
28
allowed.
The dividend equivalency test, however, remained subjective. Because section 302(b) (1) did not eliminate the indefinite
contours of the test, confusion and inconsistency continued
among courts applying section 302(b) (1). Some courts developed a strict net effect test that did not allow consideration of
the business purposes behind the redemption. 29 These courts
looked only at the final effect of the redemption, focusing primarily upon the change in the shareholder's proportionate
ownership of the corporation before and after the transaction.30
25. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 115(g), 53 Stat. 48 (current version at
I.R.C. § 302(b) (1) (1976)). Both section 115(g) of the 1939 Code and section
302(b) of the current Code were intended to prevent "stock bailouts" of corporate profits. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 20, at 36, reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 4061. See Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d 1139, 1142 (6th
Cir. 1969), rev'd on othergrounds, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
26. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 20, at 35, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4060; see S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 20, at 44, reprinted in
1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4675.
27. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 20, at 36, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4061.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 106-11.
29. See, e.g., Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811, 813-14 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 834 (1965). In applying a modified version of the strict net effect test, the First Circuit refused to consider the impact of a legitimate business purpose if, in a closely held corporation, it is "unrealistic to attempt to
segregate" shareholder and corporate interests. Bradbury v. Commissioner,
298 F.2d 111, 118 (1st Cir. 1962). See Wiseman v. United States, 371 F.2d 816, 818
(1st Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
30. See United States v. Collins, 300 F.2d 821, 823-24 (1st Cir. 1962). Courts
may also consider whether there was a corporate contraction, the history of
available earnings and past dividends, and whether the corporation or the
shareholder initiated the redemption. See, e.g., Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d
225, 229-32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 963 (1964); Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 115 (1st Cir. 1962); Kessner v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 943,
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Most courts, however, allowed a broader range of circumstances to mitigate the application of section 302(b) (1) and
adopted a flexible net effect test.3 1 This test permitted a court
to consider whether a legitimate business purpose supported
32
the redemption.
Consistent with this flexible and broad interpretation of
section 302(b) (1), the Tax Court originally held that it would
not strictly apply the attribution rules to section 302(b) (1) if it
found hostility between family members. In both Estate of
Squier v. Commissioner33 and Herbert C. Parker v. Commissioner,34 the Tax Court avoided the rigid application of section
318 by pointing out the difference between having constructive
"ownership" of stock under the Code and having "control" over
the corporation because of this "ownership." 35 Although the
court ostensibly applied section 318,36 it nullified the effects of
section 318 by finding that there was no dividend equivalence
under section 302(b) (1) because of family discord. 37 Although
the court's analyses were very brief, the court apparently reasoned that Congress enacted section 318 to prevent the taxpayer from avoiding taxes while retaining undiminished control
over the corporation, 38 and thus Congress assumed that a taxpayer's family would use its shares as the taxpayer directs.
The court must have decided that family discord makes this as944 (3d Cir. 1957) (per curiam). See generally Comment, Defining Dividend
Equivalency Under Section 302(b) (1), 16 VnL. L. REV. 88 (1970).
31. See Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d 1139, 1143-44 (6th Cir. 1969), rev'd,
397 U.S. 301 (1970); Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337, 341-42 (10th Cir.
1966); United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531, 539 (8th Cir. 1961); Edmister v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 651, 661 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 391 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1968);
Comment, supra note 30, at 96-97.
32. Courts applying the flexible net effect test also considered the other
factors applied under a strict net effect test. See supra note 30. Although these
courts examined the business purpose behind the redemption, the purpose
must have been "compelling" to overcome a finding of dividend equivalence if
the redemption wrought no real change in the proportionate ownership of the
shareholders. Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1962). See
Kerr v. Commissioner 326 F.2d 225, 235 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 963
(1964). See also Himmel v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 62, 70 (1963), rev'd on other
grounds,338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964) (emphasizing change in proportionate ownership as the most important factor).
33. 35 T.C. 950 (1961).
34. 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 893 (1961).
35. 35 T.C. at 955-56 ; 20 T.C.M. (CCH) at 900-01.
36. The court in Estate of Squier obviously applied the attribution rules. 35
T.C. at 956. The court in HerbertC. Parker never clearly said whether it applied
section 318, but instead relied heavily on the court's opinion in Estate of Squier.
20 T.C.M. (CCH) at 900-01.
37. 35 T.C. at 956; 20 T.C.M. (CCH) at 901.
38. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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sumption invalid, allowing the court to refuse to attribute the
family's stock to the taxpayer.
In United States v. Davis,39 decided after Squier and
Parker,the Supreme Court seemed to limit the circumstances
under which courts could avoid finding dividend equivalency.
Although Davis did not involve family hostility, it is the leading
case interpreting section 302(b) (1) and applying the attribution
rules to that section.40 In Davis, the taxpayer and his family
owned all the stock of a corporation. 41 The taxpayer alone held
all the preferred stock, which was issued to increase the company's working capital so that it would qualify for a Reconstruction Finance Corporation loan.42 When the corporation
redeemed this stock, in accordance with an understanding
reached when the stock was issued, the taxpayer attempted to
avoid treatment of the distribution as a dividend by arguing
that the family attribution rules did not apply to section
302(b) (1),43 and that the legitimate business purpose underlying the transaction satisfied that section's dividend nonequivalency test.44
The Supreme Court first held that the attribution rules of
section 318(a) apply to section 302(b) (1),45 rejecting the taxpayer's argument that section 302(b) (1) does not refer explicitly to stock ownership, and that Congress, therefore, did not
intend that the rules attributing stock ownership affect this section. In addition to relying on the plain meaning of the statute,
the Court reasoned that a contrary holding would essentially
nullify application of the attribution rules to sections 302(b) (2)
and (3). Even if the attribution rules disqualified a distribution
under sections 302(b) (2) and (3), the distribution would nonetheless likely qualify under section 302(b) (1), because without
constructive ownership of stock, a taxpayer could more readily
prove dividend nonequivalence. 46 The Court also held that after strictly applying section 318(a), courts could not mitigate
the effect of section 302(b) (1) by considering whether a legitimate business purpose motivated the redemption.4 7 Finding
that Congress intended courts to inquire only whether they
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

397 U.S. 301 (1970).
See Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 1975).
See 397 U.S. at 302-03.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 302-03, 305-07.
See id. at 312-13.
Id. at 307.
Id.
See id. at 313.
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could characterize the redemption as a sale, the Court stated
that courts should consider whether the redemption resulted in
a "meaningful reduction"4 8 in ownership. Because of these two
holdings, the Court noted that a redemption to a stockholder
who is the sole stockholder because of section 318 "is always
'essentially equivalent to a dividend.'- 4 9
Despite the Davis Court's rejection of the business purpose factor and the Court's language indicating the conclusiveness of the attribution rules, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit in Haft Trust v. Commissioner5 0 found that family hostility could mitigate the application of the attribution rules to
section 302(b) (1).51 In Haft Trust, Burt Haft directly owned
20% of the stock of the corporation and constructively owned
6.67% by attribution from a trust. Four other trusts, whose beneficiaries were his children, each owned 5% of the stock directly and constructively owned 26.67% by attribution of Haft's
stock first to his children and then to the trusts.5 2 Due to bitter
divorce proceedings, these four trusts redeemed their directly
owned stock to terminate their financial involvement with the
corporation.53 In arguing that the court should treat these redemptions as capital gains, the children's trusts contended that
the family hostilities should negate the attribution of the fa54
ther's stock to his children and then to the trusts.
Following Squier, the First Circuit held that family hostility
could lead to dividend nonequivalency despite the attribution
rules of section 318.55 The court supported this conclusion by
quoting Treasury Regulation section 1.302-2(b) ,56 which provides that the application of section 302(b) (1) "'depends upon
the facts and circumstances of each case. One of the facts to be
48. See id.
49. Id. at 307 (quoting Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 302(b) (1),
68A Stat. 3, 86 (current version at I.R.C. § 302(b) (1) (1976)).
50. 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975).
51. Id. at 47-48. The court remanded the case to the Tax Court because the
lower court had not considered family hostility as a mitigating factor. Id. at 48.
52. See id. at 46. Prior to the redemption, the children's trusts each owned
31.67% of the stock. 5% directly, and 26.67% which was attributed from the fa-

ther to each child under section 318(a) (1) (A) (iii) and then to each trust under
section 318(a) (3) (B).
53. See id. at 45. After the redemption, the father's share was 33.33% because 20% fewer shares were outstanding, having been redeemed by the trusts.
This share was again attributed to the trusts in the same manner, so that the
children's trusts each owned 33.33% of the stock, all constructively, after the redemption. See id. at 46 n.2.
54. See id. at 47.
55.
56.

Id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b)(1955).
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considered in making this determination is ... constructive
stock ownership .. . under section 318(a).' "57 The court argued that this regulation intimates that the attribution rules
are not, in themselves, determinative. The court also distinguished Davis, arguing that there was no family discord in
that case. Moreover, the court stated, both the legislative history of section 302(b) (1) and the Supreme Court's "meaningful
reduction" test allow a broad examination of the facts surrounding a redemption, "transcending a mere mechanical application of the attribution rules."- 8
The other issue raised in Metzger, whether the trust can
waive the application of the entity attribution rules to section
302(b)(3) by complying with section 302(c)(2), also has not
been clearly resolved.5 9 In answering this question, one must
first determine whether entities, in addition to individuals, may
waive the attribution rules under section 302(c)(2). This section refers only to the "distributee" and does not specify
whether the distributee must be an individual.60 The legislative history does not provide much guidance in revealing congressional intent. 61
57. 510 F.2d at 47 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(6) (1955)).
58. Id. at 47-48. The court felt that taxpayer equity required courts to consider family discord in applying section 318. Whether consideration of family
hostility would enhance taxpayer equity, however, is doubtful. See Comment,
Taxation-Stock Redemptions-FamilyHostility Can Mitigate the Application
of the Constructive Ownership Rules in Determining Whether a Stock Redemption is Essentially Equivalent to a Dividend, 7 TEx. TECH L. Rav. 195, 204-05

(1975).
59. Section 302(c) of the Code provides that the family attribution rules of
section 318(a) (1) shall not apply to section 302(b) (3) if the taxpayers meet several provisions. Distributees cannot have any interest in the corporation other
than as creditors, I.R.C. § 302(c) (2) (A) (i) (1976); they cannot acquire any interest in the corporation, except by bequest or inheritance, for ten years, id.
§ 302(c) (2) (A) (ii); they must fie an agreement to notify the Secretary-of any
acquisition of a prohibited interest, id. § 302(c) (2) (A) (iii); and unless the distributees can prove a non-tax avoidance motive, the waiver provisions will not
apply if the distributees acquired from, or distributed to, any person or entity
whose stock would be attributed to the distributees, any stock in the redeeming
corporation within the ten years preceding the redemption, id. § 302(c) (2) (B).
60. See id. § 302(c) (2).
61. The House report refers generally to the "distributee" or "shareholder"
without limiting these terms to individuals. H. . REP. No. 1337, supra note 20,
at A75-A76, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 4212-14. Yet, it
illustrates the provision with examples of shareholders as husband and wife.
Id. The discussion, however, is prefaced with statements relating it to the family attribution rules. This may imply a limitation of the provision to the family
situation. Id. The Senate report similarly does not explicitly limit the availability of waivers to individuals, but it does refer to the distributee as 'him" or
"himself" and to "members of the family of the distributee." S. REP. No. 1622,
supra note 20, at 235-37, reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4872-
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Despite the inconclusive legislative record, and contrary to
the position of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),62 the Tax
Court has concluded that entities can waive the attribution
rules. In Crawford v. Commissioner,63 the Tax Court held that
an estate can waive the family attribution rules which would
have attributed stock to the estate's sole beneficiary. 64 This allowed the estate to avoid the attribution of stock from the beneficiary to the estate under the entity attribution rules. The
court noted that the statute referred only to "distributees" and
pointed out that the legislative history was ambiguous. 65 Although the court admitted that taxpayer abuse was possible, it
rejected the Commissioner's position because it would have the
absurd result of treating the beneficiary's half of the redemption as a sale, and the estate's half as a dividend.66 The court
also reasoned that limiting the waiver provision to individuals
would create a tax trap for the unwary; entities that knew
about their inability to waive section 318 would merely distribute the shares to their beneficiaries prior to the redemption-who would then waive the attribution rules-rather than
distribute the proceeds to their beneficiaries after the redemption. 67 Reaffirming this analysis, the Tax Court later held in
Rogers P. Johnson Trust v. Commissioner68 that a trust, as well
as an estate, 69 could use the waiver provisions of section
7
302(c). 0
Given a trust's ability to waive section 318, one must also
73. The Senate report, like the House report, illustrates this provision with a
husband and wife example. Id. The Senate report also prefaces its detailed
discussion by referring to family attribution rules. Id.
62. Rev. Rul. 72-472, 1972-2 C.B. 202 (trust cannot waive family attribution
rules); Rev. Rul. 68-388, 1968-2 C.B. 122 (estate cannot waive family attribution
rules); Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 C.B. 106 (trust cannot waive family attribution
rules). See Crawford v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 830, 834-35 (1973). See generally
Philipps & Kelley, supra note 21, at 248-501; Schnee, Stock Redemptions from
Estates and Trusts-ContinuedConfusion, 11 TAx ADWsER 348, 351-52 (1980).
63. 59 T.C. 830 (1973).
64. Id. at 834.
65. Id. at 835-36.
66. Id. at 836.
67. Id. at 837. See Rev. Rul. 79-67, 1979-1 C.B. 128. In this ruling, the IRS
suggested that beneficiaries must use this procedure to avoid dividend treatment of corporate redemptions. See Philipps & Kelley, supra note 21, at 249.
68. 71 T.C. 941 (1979).
69. The IRS treats estates and trusts identically for purposes of the attribution rules. See supra note 62. Nevertheless, the IRS unsuccessfully argued
in Johnson Trust that the court should treat them differently. 71 T.C. at 953-54.
70. Id. at 955. The court noted the interest a trust may have in waiving
family attribution if faced with the alternatives of holding non-income producing assets of a closely held corporation or redeeming the assets and incurring
adverse income tax consequences due to the family attribution rules. Id. at 954.
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ask specifically whether a trust can waive the entity attribution
rules of sections 318(a)(2) and (3). The statute explicitly allows waiver of only the family attribution rules of section
318(a) (1).71 Although the court in Johnson Trust held that this
language prohibited distributees from waiving the entity attribution rules, 72 the Fifth Circuit reached a different conclusion.
In Rickey v. United States,73 the court held that an estate's
waiver of the entity attribution rules was valid.7 4 Pursuant to
its articles of incorporation and the decedent's will, the corporation in Rickey redeemed the stock that the estate owned but
did not redeem the stock owned by the estate's beneficiaries.
The estate thus attempted to waive the entity attribution rules,
which would have attributed the beneficiary's stock to the estate. In upholding this attempt, the court refused to adhere to
the Code's literal limits restricting waiver to the family attribution rules.7 5 The court found that such a "crabbed reading"
would yield "inappropriately harsh results" 76 for a taxpayer
estate whose sole purpose was to carry out the provisions of
the will and not to avoid taxes. 77 Furthermore, the court found
that Congress intended that "common sense and basic principles of fairness" 78 govern enforcement of the Code, citing the
79
Senate's purpose in readopting the dividend equivalency test.
In holding that courts should not consider family hostility
in applying the attribution rules to section 302(b) (1),80 the Tax
Court in Metzger found that Congress intended to establish
precise and definite standards for determining both constructive ownership of stock and the tax consequences of corporate
redemptions. 8 1 The court reasoned that allowing a family hostility inquiry would create the uncertainty and confusion in tax
71. The prefatory language of section 302(c) (2) states that "f[in the case of
a distribution described in (b)(3), section 318(a)(1) shall not apply." LR.C.
§ 302(c)(2) (1976).
72. 71 T.C. at 952.
73. 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979).
74. Id. at 1258.
75. Id. at 1257. The court acknowledged that a literal reading of the Code
prohibited waiver of the entity attribution rules.
76. Id. at 1258.

77. See id.
78. Id.
79. See id. The court also suggested that the estate's redemption would
qualify as a meaningful reduction in interest under LIC. § 302(b) (1) (1976).
592 F.2d at 1258.
80. 76 T.C. at 61. The argument that the court rejected here is based on
Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955). See infra text accompanying notes 89-90.
81. 76 T.C. at 56-57, 60.
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planning and administration that Congress wished to avoid.82
Such an inquiry, the court believed, would require complex and
particular factflnding with little precedential value. 83 The court
declined to interpret the statute contrary to the plain meaning
of its language and the indications of congressional intent
merely because the court might disagree with Congress's pur84
poses or assumptions.
The court relied on Davis in formulating its test for applying the attribution rules to section 302(b) (1). Interpreting the
Supreme Court's opinion differently than the First Circuit did
in Haft Trust, the Tax Court believed that Davis required a
straightforward application of section 318, regardless of family
hostility or other mitigating factors. 85 If, after the direct use of
section 318, there has been no reduction in the stockholder's
proportionate interest, there is automatic dividend equivalency.86 If, after application of the attribution rules, the redemption causes a reduction in the stockholder's interest, a
court may consider family hostility in determining whether this
reduction is meaningful. 87 According to the Metzger court, the
latter situation is the only case in which Davis allows courts to
8
consider family hostility.8
82. Id. at 54-55.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 59-60.
85. Id. at 60-61.
86. Id. at 61. To support this contention, the court quoted the portion of
Davis in which the Supreme Court stated that if, after application of the attribution rules, the taxpayer is the sole shareholder, then the redemption is always essentially equivalent to a dividend. Id. at 61 n.14.
87. Id. at 61. Judge Tannenwald's concurrence sharply criticizes this reasoning as creating a meaningless distinction between family corporations that
are wholly owned by related individuals, and those with one insignificant unrelated shareholder. Id. at 84 (Tannenwald, 3., concurring). Tannenwald held
against the taxpayer because the remaining shareholders after the redemption
were not hostile toward each other, a fact which distinguished Metzger from
Haft Trust. Id. at 83. Tannenwald suggests that family hostility may be a valid
consideration in applying the attribution rules, but construed the Davis opinion
as not deciding "the extent to which the [attributionrules] apply]" to section
302(b) (1) when family discord is present. Id. at 81-82 & n.4. But see infra notes
119-24 and accompanying text (discussing implications of Davis regarding family hostility); infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (discussing the proper
interpretation of Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955)).
88. The Tax Court also suggested that a family discord argument would be
relevant in rebutting an assertion by the IRS that a court should attribute stock
between shareholders whose relationship is not covered by section 318, such as
a sibling relationship. 76 T.C. at 63. The Tax Court further noted that despite
the harsh effect of applying the attribution rules mechanically under Davis,the
Supreme Court has declined to reconsider the rules it established in that case.
Id. at 64. See Albers v. Commissioner, 414 U.S. 982 (1973) (denying certiorari).
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After discussing this test, the court dismissed two final arguments. The court first said that the taxpayer had misinterpreted Treasury Regulation section 1.302-2(b),89 concluding that
this regulation did not permit courts to disregard constructively
owned stock in applying section 302(b) (1).90 If courts did so,
claimed the Metzger court, they would be acting "contrary to
the plain meaning of the statute and its legislative history."9 '
The Tax Court employed the same reasoning in rejecting the
division of a shareholder's interest in a corporation into the
components of ownership and control. 92
In addition to holding that family hostility does not negate
the application of the family attribution rules to section
302(b) (1), the court held that the trust could not waive the entity attribution rules under section 302(c) (2).93 The court first
rejected any reliance on Johnson Trust by noting that the trust
94
The
in that case waived only the family attribution rules.
court rejected the Fifth Circuit's liberal interpretation of the
waiver provision in Rickey,95 relying primarily on the Senate
report which states that waiver under section 302(c) (2) applies
only to the family attribution rules.96 Finding that the Rickey
court had, in effect, added a new provision to the Code by allowing waiver of the entity attribution rules, 97 the court then
repeated its view that a reviewing court must exercise judicial
98
restraint and avoid rewriting statutes that it finds unwise.
Both of the Metzger court's holdings are clearly correct. In
concluding that family hostility does not nullify the application
of the family attribution rules to section 302(b) (1),99 the court
89. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
90. 76 T.C. at 61-62.
91. Id. at 62.

92. Id.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

74.
66.
68.
68-69. See supra text accompanying note 22. The House report is

in accord with the Senate report. 'The rules offamily ownership will not apply" if the taxpayer complies with the -terms of sections 302(b) (3) and
302(c) (2). H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 20, at 36, reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. &AD.NEWS at 4061 (emphasis added).
97. 76 T.C. at 71.
98. Id. at 70-71. The Tax Court rejected the argument that it must follow
the Fifth Circuit's holding in Rickey merely because Metzger was appealable to
that court. Id. at 72-73. The court found that Rickey and Metzger were factually
distinguishable; unlike the estate in Rickey, which had to redeem its stock
under the terms of the will, the trust in Metzger was not required by the trust
instrument to redeem its stock. The redemption was made solely to carry out
the desires of the trust's beneficiaries. Id. at 72-74.
99. Bittker and Eustice apparently have also reached this conclusion.
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accurately perceived the intent of Congress and the meaning of
the Davis opinion. Congress enacted section 302 to avoid "the
morass created by the decisions" under the broad standards of
section 115(g).10 To eliminate this confusion and thus to facilitate tax planning and tax administration, Congress created
more objective tests of dividend equivalency.101 The House
proposed the "safe harbor" tests of sections 302(b) (2) and
(3),102 which provide definite rules for "the guidance of taxpayers." 103 By eliminating the "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" test, the House intended to avoid the complex factual
analyses which were inherent under section 115(g).104 In its
consideration of the bill, the Senate, however, retained the dividend equivalency test. The Senate suggested that the "definite
conditions" adopted by the House were "unnecessarily restrictive, particularly, in the case.., of preferred stock.., called
by the corporation without the shareholder having any control
over when the redemption may take place."'05
Although retention of the dividend equivalency test suggests that the Senate intended to follow existing law,106 a careCompare B. B'rrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA§ 7.24, at 292 (2d ed. 1966), with B. BrSKER & J. Eus-

TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS

TICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 9.24, at
9-26 n.43 (3d ed. 1971) and B. BITrKER & J. EusTiCE, supra note 11, 9.21.
100. Ballanger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1962). See supra
text accompanying notes 25-26.
101. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 20, at 35, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4060.
102. See authorities cited supra note 12.
103. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 20, at 35-36, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4060-61.
104. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 20, at A73, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 4210.
105. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 20, at 44, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 4675.
106. Id. Some of the factors courts considered in applying section 115(g) of
the 1939 Code included: whether the redemption was part of a planned corporate contraction; whether earnings and profits were sufficient to fund a dividend, whether the corporation had a history of paying dividends; whether the
corporation remained profitable after the redemption; whether the motive behind the redemption was for tax avoidance or a legitimate business purpose;
whether the distribution was pro rata; whether the shareholder or corporation
initiated the redemption; and whether corporate ownership was significantly
changed after the redemption. See United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496, 500-01
(5th Cir. 1958); Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 1940). See also McGuire v.
Commissioner, 84 F.2d 431, 432 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 591 (1936) (application of section 115(g) of Revenue Act of 1928); Brown v. Commissioner, 79
F.2d 73, 74 (3d Cir. 1935) (same); Commissioner v. Champion, 78 F.2d 513, 514
(6th Cir. 1935) (same). See also Comment, Income Tax: Stock Redemption and
the Testfor Dividend Equivalency Under Section 302(b) (1) of the InternalRevenue Code of 1954, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 188, 189 (1970).
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ful reading of the Senate report reveals an intent to narrow the
application of section 302(b) (1).107 In addition to suggesting
that section 302(b) (1) would apply only to preferred stock redemptions, 108 the Senate report also stated that the only relevant question in applying that provision was whether the
transaction could properly be characterized as a sale of stock
by the redeeming shareholder to the corporation.10 9 Although
this question requires a factual analysis, the Senate did not intend the inquiry to be as broad as the inquiries made under
section 115(g) of the 1939 Code.110
Congress specifically ascribed part of the confusion and uncertainty that section 115(g) engendered to the courts' haphazard application of the attribution rules to section 115(g)."' In
discussing the language of section 318, the House Ways and
Means Committee stated that "the administration of provision
[sic] such as section 115(g)(1) . . .has become clouded with
uncertainty by reason of executive application of rules of attribution of ownership. Your committee intends, through section
311 [now section 318], to remove these uncertainties by providing in the bill precise rules for attribution where this is appropriate."" 2 The House report indicates that, like the objective
standards of sections 302(b)(2) and (3), section 302(c)(1),
107. See S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 20, at 234, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. &AD.NEWS at 4870-71. See also B. BrrTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 11,

9.24 at 9-29 to 9-30; Comment, supra note 30, at 96. But cf.Kahn, supra note 12,
at 21-22, 28 (suggesting that the Senate's intention to follow existing law in applying section 302(b) (1) implied no such limitation on the factual inquiries in
determining dividend equivalency).
108. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
109. S.REP. No. 1622, supra note 20, at 234, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEWS at 4870-71.

110. Specifically, the Senate did not want courts to consider "the presence
or absence of earnings and profits of the corporation." S. REP. No. 1622, supra
note 20, at 234, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 4871. Moreover, it is doubtful that Congress intended that courts consider the presence of
a planned corporate contraction because the 1954 Code provides separately for
corporate redemptions, LR.C. §§ 301-318 (1976), and partial liquidations, id.
§§ 331-346. See Comment, supra note 30, at 96. See also Ballenger v. United
States, 301 F.2d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531, 53435 (8th Cir. 1961).
111. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 20, at A96, reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 4234. Compare In re Estate of Lukens, 246 F.2d 403,
407 (3d Cir. 1957) (rejecting the significance of the relationship between the redeeming shareholder and his children, as remaining shareholders, in finding no
dividend equivalency) with William H. Grimditch, 37 B.T.A. 402, 412 (1938)
(where shareholders had given large blocks of stock to their wives prior to the
redemption of their remaining stock, the shareholders could not avoid a finding
of dividend equivalence).
112. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 20, at A96, reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEWS at 4234.
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which states that section 318(a) "shall" apply to section 302(b),
was enacted to reduce the confusion that the old Code created.
Section 302(c) (1) does not contain exceptions for family
hostility."

3

If courts negate the attribution rules under section
302(b) (1) by concluding that there is family hostility, they will
reintroduce the uncertainty that Congress arguably attempted
to eliminate. Finding family hostility would require a lengthy
factual examination, an inquiry not susceptible to clear standards. Thus, questioning whether there is family hostility
would abrogate the "precise rules" established in section 302.
This, in turn, would undermine Congress's goal of simplifying
tax planning and tax administration." 4 A family hostility analysis would complicate tax planning because honest taxpayers
5
would be uncertain of the factors that courts would consider."
This analysis would also adversely affect tax administration,
not only because of the difficult task of formulating standards
to measure family hostility,116 but also because of the difficulty
of detecting fraudulent claims of family discord."7 Courts

would also have to confront the troublesome problem of determining the tax consequences of a future resolution of the family dispute." 8 Thus, Metzger properly applied Congress's
113. The House report states that section 302(c) "makes clear that the rules
of attribution of ownership provided in section 311 [now section 318] will be applicable in determining ownership of stock for the purpose of section 302." H.R.
REP. No. 1337, supra note 20, at A75, reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4212.
114. See Ringel, Surrey & Warren, Attribution of Stock Ownership in the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HAxv. L. REv. 209, 209 (1958); Surrey, Income Tax
Problems of Corporationsand Shareholders: American Law Institute Tax Project-American Bar Association Committee Study on Legislative Revision, 14
TAx L. REV. 1, 51 (1958). See also Commissioner v. Estate of Antrim, 395 F.2d
430, 434 (4th Cir. 1968).
115. This inability to engage in tax planning can lead to inequitable results.
Fortunate taxpayers might coincidentally have a family feud while their closely
held corporation was redeeming stock. This might result in favorable exchange
treatment even if the hostility is only temporary. See Comment, supra note 58,
at 205.
116. See Comment, FederalIncome Taxation-Section 318-Family Hostility May Negate Application of Stock Attribution Rules to Section 302(b) (1)
Stock Redemption, 7 RuT.-CAm. L. REV. 609, 615 (1976).
117. Considering the self-serving nature of taxpayer testimony regarding
family hostility, it would be nearly impossible to disprove fraudulent claims
based on a feigned family dispute. Cf.Comment, supra note 58, at 205 (suggesting that a planned dispute may readily afford a taxpayer the benefit of capital gains treatment for a redemption where no dispute actually exists).
118. See Comment, supra note 116, at 615. Furthermore, it is doubtful that
this difficult factual inquiry is justified because of the small number of cases
involving family hostility. See Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43, 48 (1st
Cir. 1975).
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intent in passing sections 302 and 318.
In Davis, the Supreme Court provided further reason to
endorse Metzger. The Supreme Court emphasized that Congress intended section 302(b) (1) to have a narrow scope.119 In
deference to this intent, the Court rejected the business purpose test, signalling that courts may not accept broad inquiries
into family hostility under section 302(b) (1).120 More importantly, the Court intimated that courts should apply the attribution rules to section 302(b) (1) without regard to mitigating
factors. The Davis opinion noted that Congress intended that
the rules apply "wherever ownership of stock was relevant."'21
By their nature, the attribution rules either apply to attribute
stock or they do not apply they cannot apply to a lesser extent
to partially attribute stock. The Court's language, therefore,
seems to preclude a family hostility analysis. In addition, the
Davis test suggests that courts should take mitigating factors
into account only in evaluating the "meaningfulness" of a reduction in ownership, and not in evaluating whether initially to
recognize such a reduction.122 Thus, under Davis, if there is no
reduction after application of the attribution rules, courts may
not further consider the tax effects of the redemption-it "is always 'essentially equivalent to a dividend.' "1123 Although Davis
119. 397 U.S. at 311. See supra text accompanying notes 39-49.
120. See Cavitch, Problems Arising from the Attribution Rules, 35 INST. ON
FED. TAX'N 801, 832 (1977); Comment, supra note 21, at 238. The Supreme Court
in Davis was also concerned that if the attribution rules did not apply to section 302(b) (1), the purpose and effect of the safe harbor rules would be nullified. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Allowing a family hostility
analysis to affect the application of the attribution rules to section 302(b) (1) arguably has this same nullifying effect. But see Jacobson, CorporationDistributions: Not Essentially Equivalent to a Dividend, Assignment of Income and
Other Problems, 33 INsT. ON FED. TAX'N 1007, 1012-13 (1975) (since Court relied

on authorities that did not mandate application of the attribution rules, it only
required that they be "considered"). Jacobson's analysis fails primarily because those authorities pre-dated Davis, and thus reflected earlier Tax Court
decisions such as Squier and Parker. See, e.g., Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298
F.2d 111, 116 n.7 (1st Cir. 1962). Moreover, the circuit court cases that the
Supreme Court cited applied the attribution rules mechanically. See, e.g.,
Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337, 342 (10th Cir. 1966); Ballenger v.
United States, 301 F.2d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1962).
121. 397 U.S. at 307.
122. Id. at 313.
123. Id. at 307 (quoting Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 302(b) (1),
68A Stat. 3, 86 (current version at LRLC. § 302(b) (1) (1976)). Because of the circumstances of the Davis case, the Supreme Court seemed to limit this automatic evaluation to circumstances in which the attribution rules make the
taxpayer a sole shareholder. Of course, this was the case in Metzger. See supra
note 3.
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did not involve family hostility,124 the language of the opinion,
in conjunction with the legislative history of sections 302 and
318, suggests that courts should apply the attribution rules literally, without a factual inquiry into family hostility.
The Metzger court correctly dismissed the two arguments
opposing its refusal to consider family hostility under section
302(b) (1). The Tax Court did not construe Treasury Regulation
section 1.302-2(b) to allow courts only to consider, but not literally to apply, the attribution rules to section 302(b) (1).125 Since
this interpretation is equivalent to ignoring the attribution
rules,126 it violates the Davis Court's mandate to apply section
318 "wherever" stock ownership is an issue. 127 It is also inconsistent with the legislative history of sections 302 and 318. Finally, the interpretation is contrary to Treasury Regulation
section 1.302-1(a), which provides that section 318(a) "applies
to all redemptions under section 302" except those meeting the
requirements for waiver under section 302(c) (2).128 The second
argument, that courts should distinguish between ownership
and control of corporate stock, 1 29 is also incorrect. Those who
make this distinction contend, at least implicitly, that courts
should not apply section 318 if the assumption underlying that
section, family harmony, is absent. 30 One should reject this
contention in light of the strong contrary indications of congressional intent and the implication of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Davis.131
124. The Haft Trust court used this basis to distinguish Davis. See Haft
Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d at 47.
125. The court rejected other decisions with contrary holdings. See, e.g.,
Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d at 47. See also Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. at 82 n.4 (Tannenwald, J., concurring); Jacobson, supra note 123,
at 1013.
126. See 76 T.C. at 61-62.
127. See supra text accompanying note 121.
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-1(a) (1955).
129. See Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d at 46-47; Estate of Squier v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C. at 955-56; Herbert C. Parker v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 900-01. One commentator has argued that a factual inquiry into family hostility may be justified because courts must always make a factual decision in applying section 302(b). See Comment, Federal Income Tax-Family
Hostility as Mitigating the Constructive Oumership Rules of Section 318 When
Applied to the Dividend Equivalency Provision of Section 302(b) (1), 55 B.U.L.
REv. 667, 667 (1975). Both Congress, see supra notes 99-118 and accompanying
text, and the Supreme Court, see supra note 119 and accompanying text, have
indicated, however, that courts should keep factual inquiries to a minimum in
applying section 302(b) (1).
130. See supra text accompanying note 38.
131. Moreover, Congress probably did not intend that courts should distinguish between ownership and control in applying section 302(b) (1) if the definition of control for the purposes of section 304 is analogous to section 302(b)
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In addition to properly applying the family attribution rules

to section 302(b) (1) in cases involving family hostility, the
Metzger court properly denied the trust's attempted waiver 3of3
13 2
Both the statutory language
the entity attribution rules.
34
and the legislative intent1 are clear; waiver under section
302(c) (2) applies only to the family attribution rules of section
318(a) (1).135 The entity attribution rules136 are not waivable
because these rules attribute stock ownership based on a common economic interest. The family attribution rules impute
stock ownership on the basis of a family relationship, which
7
may not necessarily reflect a common economic interest.13
The Rickey court's contrary holding is, therefore, unjustifiable.138 Moreover, the result in Rickey vastly increases the
possibility of tax avoidance by allowing any taxpayer who includes a mandatory stock redemption provision in his or her
will to waive the entity attribution rules.139 Although Crawford
and Johnson Trust are correctly reasoned,14 0 these cases are inapposite because they permit entities to waive only the family
determinations. "[C]ontrol means the ownership of stock possessing at least
50 percent of the total" of the voting power or value of the corporation's stock.
I.R.C. § 304(c)(1) (1976). Section 318(a) also applies to section 304(c). Id.
§ 304(c)(2) (1976).
132. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 71.
134. See S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 20, at 235-36, reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 4872-73; H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 20, at 36, reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 4061.
135. See Cavitch, supra note 120, at 801.
136. LR.C. §§ 318(a) (3) (1976). The attribution rules regarding options
would be similarly treated. See id. § 318(a) (4).
137. See B. BrrrER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 11, 9.23, at 9-26.
138. See Kahn, supra note 12, at 12; Philipps & Kelley, supra note 21, at 258;
supra text accompanying notes 73-79.
139. See Philipps & Kelley, supra note 21, at 258-59; Comment, Stock Redemptions and the Estate-Attribution Rules, 128 U. PA. I REV. 650, 654-55
(1980).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 63-70. The Johnson Trust and
Crawford cases were correctly decided because a trust or an estate may clearly
have a valid interest in avoiding the family attribution rules. Rogers P. Johnson Trust v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 954. Although the Commissioner argued
that allowing trusts to waive family attribution created possibilities of tax
avoidance because the trust's beneficiaries would not be bound by the waiver
agreement of the trust, see supra text accompanying note 67, one could avoid
this problem by changing the regulations or enacting legislation to require the
beneficiaries to file such an agreement. The beneficiaries did this in both Crawford and Johnson Trust, but the court did not hold that these agreements were
either required or effective under section 302(c)(2). See Rogers P. Johnson
Trust v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 952; Crawford v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. at 837.
Courts could also prevent this abuse by voiding the waiver agreement if a beneficiary, who is the real party in economic interest, acquires stock in the corporation within ten years. See Philipps & Kelley, supra note 21, at 254 n.77. For a
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attribution rules and do not discuss an entity's waiver of the
141
entity attribution rules.

Assuming that courts apply the attribution rules to section
302(b) (1) without regard to family hostility, closely held corporations can still avoid unfavorable tax consequences for stock
redemptions with careful planning.142 The first possible approach would require the shareholders to convey their stock to
a cooperative, unrelated third party. Since this conveyance
would clearly be a sale, the proceeds would be taxed at capital
gains rates. Later, the third party could redeem all the stock
and also receive capital gains treatment under section
302(b) (3).
This procedure involves several risks. First, the IRS may
apply the step transaction doctrine,143 treating the proposed series of transactions as steps in one integrated transaction that
effectively pays dividends to the original shareholders with the
third party merely acting as a conduit.144 Taxpayers are free,
however, to structure their transactions in any legal manner to
reduce their taxes,145 and generally courts will not restructure
transactions designed by taxpayers to minimize their tax liability.146 Yet, to avoid application of the step transaction doctrine,

the taxpayer should be advised to allow a significant amount of
time to pass before the corporation redeems the third party's
stock. In addition, the third party should be independent of the
taxpayer147 so that the transaction will not be regarded as a
discussion of the problems raised by allowing entities to waive the family attribution rules, see Kahn, supra note 12, at 13-15.
141. Even if the trust in Metzger had attempted to waive the family attribution rules, it would still have constructively owned 720 of the 1221 outstanding
shares because of the entity attribution rules. The 120 shares held in the individual trust for Jacob are first attributed to him under section 318(a) (2) (B),
and are then attributed to the David Metzger Trust along with the 600 shares
that Jacob directly owned under section 318(a) (3) (B). Thus, there still would
not be a complete redemption of the trust's stock under section 302(b) (3).
142. See generally Corneel, Dealingwith Conflicts in Family Corporations,
15 INST. ON EST. PLAN.

1800 (1981).

143. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); B.
Brr=R &J. EUsTCE, supra note 11, T 1.05, at 1-20 to 1-22.
144. See, e.g., Carrington v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 704, 706 (5th Cir. 1973);
Palmer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684, 692 (1974), aff'd on other grounds, 523 F.2d
1308 (8th Cir. 1975); B. Brr=KR &J. EUSTICE, supra note 11, T 9.25, at 9-41 to 9-42.
145. See, e.g., Carrington v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 704, 706 (5th Cir. 1973);
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
146. See, e.g., Grove v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1973); Carrington v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 704, 706 (5th Cir. 1973).
147. For example, the taxpayer cannot require the donee to tender the stock
for redemption. See Palmer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684, 695 (1974); Rev. RuL
78-197, 1978-1 CB. 83.
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sham.14
The second risk associated with the sale of stock to an unrelated third party is potential dilution of corporate control. Although one commentator suggested that a sale of common
stock may not entail as much risk for a controlling shareholder
as one might expect,149 this risk varies with the facts of each

case. In Metzger, for example, the corporation redeemed roughly 60 percent of the outstanding stock.150 A single sale of this
magnitude could threaten the controlling shareholder's objective of remaining in control of the corporation, since the third
party could delay redemption or sell the stock to some uncooperative party. A series of sales, however, with the controlling
shareholder retaining ownership as long as possible, would
minimize this risk.
Another alternative for trusts that confront the situation
faced by the David Metzger Trust would require the remaining
shareholder to convey his or her beneficial rights to the stock
under the trust.151 Using the Metzger case as an example, the
son could transfer his remaining interest in the stock to one of
his sisters who could pay him the present value of his future
interest in the stock. The corporation would then redeem the
stock. Hence, the only remaining stock that the son owned
would not be attributed to the trust, because the son was no
longer a beneficiary. 5 2 If beneficiaries of other trusts who are
148. See, e.g., Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874, 879-81 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967). See generally Gallagher, Common Stock
Bailouts: A Planning Device for the Close Corporation,11 TAx ADVISER 106
(1980); Lowe, Bailouts: Their Role in Corporate Planning, 30 TAx L. REV. 357
(1975). Gallagher discusses bailouts of redeemable nonvoting common stock,
which can be successfully redeemed through a third party with favorable tax
consequences. Gallagher, supra, at 107-08. It would seem that similar transactions involving ordinary common stock, with a higher risk of diluting corporate
control than non-voting stock, would be less vulnerable to attack by the IRS.
See Lowe, supra, at 418.
149. Lowe, supra note 148, at 414.
150. The corporation redeemed 1779 of the 3000 outstanding shares. See
supra note 3.
151. Generally, the beneficiary of a trust has power to transfer his or her interests if the terms of the trust instrument do not restrain such transfer. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS §§ 2, 132, 152-53 (1959).
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.318-3(a) (1955) defines a beneficiary of an estate as "any
person entitled to receive property." This definition arguably applies to trust
beneficiaries as well, because their interests in a trust are actuarially defined
under Treas. Reg. § 1.318-3(b) (1955) according to the estate tax regulations
concerned with the valuation of various forms of property. See Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-7 (1970).
The son's role as trustee should not create a problem under these regulations. Generally, a decedent's gross estate includes the value of property over
which the decedent has possessed, exercised, or released certain powers of ap-
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in the same position as the son in Metzger sold their future interest in the corporation's stock, and if they effectively terminated all their other rights and interests as beneficiaries,153 the
trust would, in those cases, also avoid tax liability.
A final possibility for avoiding unfavorable tax consequences would involve terminating the trust instead of terminating only the beneficiary's interest in it. If all the trust
beneficiaries consent, they can compel termination of the trust,
if continuance of the trust is not necessary to achieve a mate-

rial purpose of the

trust.

5 4

In the Metzger case, for example,

since the continuation of the trust was not necessary,' 55 the
trust could be terminated with the consent of the beneficiaries
and the stock and other trust property distributed to the beneficiaries. The stock redemptions which would sever the siblings'
business and financial interests would create no tax problems,
because each sibling whose stock was redeemed could then
waive the attribution of ownership from the son under section
302(c) (2), thereby qualifying for capital gains treatment under
section 302(b) (3).
This alternative is probably the best solution to the
problems the Metzger family members confronted in separating their interests. Because the trust was the source of all the
attribution problems, this alternative would most effectively assure capital gains treatment for the stock redemptions, while
avoiding the risks associated with either stock redemptions
through a third party or a transfer of the son's beneficial interpointment. I.R.C. § 2041 (1976); Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(a) (1961). The power to
manage a trust in a trustee's fiduciary capacity without the power to enlarge or
to shift the trust's beneficial interests, except as an incidental consequence of
the exercise of such fiduciary duties, is not a power of appointment. Treas.
Reg. § 20.2041-1(b) (1961). Moreover, the release of such a power should create
no problem for the taxpayer if it is accomplished in a transaction for adequate
consideration. Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-1 (a) (1958).
153. If trust beneficiaries irrevocably renounce their rights and interests in
their trusts and these renunciations are effective under state law, the trust's
stock will not be attributed to them if the corporation redeems their stock. Rev.
Rul. 71-211, 1971-1 C.B. 112. Presumably, they also will not be considered beneficiaries for the purpose of attributing their stock to their trusts. Cavitch, supra
note 120, at 815.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959). If the decedent, for example, established the trust for the support of a beneficiary, the beneficiaries
cannot terminate the trust by their consent. See id. at comment m.
155. Under the facts that the Metzger court provided, the trust was apparently not established for the mother's support. 76 T.C. at 47. To terminate the
trust, the mother could either disclaim her interest in the trust income, or the
children could acquire her interest and compensate her for the actuarial value
thereof. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 comment f, illustrations 8
& 9 (1959); supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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est in the trust.5 6 Furthermore, a termination of the trust
would sever the siblings' financial interests, since there would
be no potential for conflict over the son's management as
trustee of the trust property. This alternative would more effectively separate the siblings' interests than the redemption
plan that the family actually pursued in Metzger.
Therefore, the Metzger court's analysis was sound. Entities
may not waive the entity attribution rules. In addition, although the mechanical application of the attribution rules to
section 302 may create harsh results for some taxpayers, the
statutory language and congressional intent require strict adherence to the words of the Code. The Supreme Court recognized this in Davis, and required that courts apply the
attribution rules in a straightforward manner and avoid extensive factual inquiries in determining dividend equivalency
under section 302(b) (1). Taxpayers can prevent the rare cases
in which family hostility may create harsh results under a
strict application of the attribution rules through careful
planning.

156.

See supra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.

